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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MELVILLE L. MORRIS, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
DWANE J. SYKES and 
PATRICIA SKYES, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 16838 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent brought an action asking the trial court for 
an order requring appellants to accept the unpaid balance due 
under a land purchase contract and to execute and deliver a 
warranty deed to the property to the respondent, or, in the 
alternative, to relieve respondent from the harshness of the 
forfeiture and retaking of the property by appellants, as 
sellers, without compensation to respondent, as buyer, and 
asking the Court to order appellants to return to respondent the 
money paid on the contract by respondent, or such part as the 
Court found to be equitable. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried on June 14, 15 and 18, 1979, before 
the Honorable J. Robert Bullock sitting in equity without a 
jury. The Court found in favor the the appellants and against 
the respondent on the issue of requiring the appellants to 
accept the unpaid contract balance and deed the property to 
respondent. The Court found for respondent and against the 
appellants holding that the forfeiture and retaking of the 
property and retaining the money paid on the contract was a 
wholly unreasonable penalty and its enforcement under all the 
circumstances to be inequitable. The Court entered judgment 
requring a reimbursement to the respondent buyer of $14,121.54 
of the $23,216.72 paid on the contract. Appellants Motion to 
Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment, or 
in the Alternative for a New Trial was denied by the Court on 
December 24, 1979. Appellants' appealed this decision of the 
Court and its denial of the Motion to Amend the Findings or in 
the Alternative for a New Trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the Court sustain the trial 
court and find that under Alaska law and the facts of the case 
the enforcement of a strict forfeiture would be a violation of 
the basic principals of equity, good conscience, and fair 
dealing. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 3, 1974, the respondent, as buyer, entered 
into a real estate contract with appellants, as sellers, of a 
vacant tract of land of approximately 27 acres known as Tract 
"B" of the Musk Ox Subdivision located near Fairbanks, Alaska. 
The contract provided for a $2,000.00 down payment and monthly 
payments of $350.00 commencing December 1, 1974. In addition, 
the buyer was to pay $1,000.00 November 1, 1974, $5,000.00 on 
February 1, 1974 $5,000.00, August 1, 1975, and $3,000.00 each 
succeeding February 1 and August 1 until November 1, 1979, when 
the contract balance was to be paid in full. The total purchase 
price was $40,000.00 (Exh. 1). 
The parties agreed First National Bank of Fairbanks, 
Alaska, would be the escrow agent for the transaction to hold 
certain papers and receive the contract payments. Respondent, 
as buyer, was informed there was a trust deed lien on the 
property held by the same bank and that respondent 's contract 
payments would be used by the bank to make the payments on the 
trust deed obligation. 
After the execution of the agreement appellant, Dwane 
Skyes, moved to Utah. The respondent's residence was divided 
between Florida, California and Brussels, Belgium. All payments 
made by respondent, except one payment of $1,000.00, were made 
by respondent to the escrow bank (Exh. 5). 
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The monthly payments and periodic lump sum payments 
were often made late or at different times than called for by 
the contract, and many payments were made in amounts different 
than called for. The contract was in default almost from its 
inception and was seriously in default at the time of the 
termination, November 11, 1976. (Exh. 5) 
Because of the way the payments were made, the fact 
that respondent was in and between Brussels, Florida and 
California, and appellants were in Utah, considerable confusion 
and misunderstanding developed regarding the status of the pay-
ments. Appellants in their statement of facts go into consider-
able detail to show that respondent was deliberately misrepre-
senting to the appellants the payments he had made and the 
status of the contract, but a careful reading of the entire 
transcript indicates the so called misrepresentations were more 
likely an outgrowth of confusion on the subject and lack of 
communication between the parties. 
Appellants sent written communications to respondent on 
December 3, 1975, advising that payments were several months 
behind and on December 29, 1975, advising that the last monthly 
payments made were for July and August of 1975, and that 
appellants' loan at the bank was delinquent because of 
respondent's delinquency and subject to termination which the 
bank could initiate at any moment. No subsequent written notice 
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was given to respondent regarding the contract delinquency, and 
appellants continued to accept late payments. 
Between October 3, 1974 and August 2, 1976, respondent 
made some fourteen payments totaling $23,216.72 of which 
$3,507.38 was in payment of interest and $19,709.34 was applied 
to principal. The unpaid contract balance after the August 2, 
1976 payment was $20,290.66. 
Respondent testified that in August 1976, he decided to 
try to refinance the contract, went to the escrow bank in early 
September and received ~entative approval for a loan to pay off 
the contract; and on October 5, 1976 signed a note, and trust 
deed for the loan and furnished the bank with an updated title 
report, a current appraisal and a financial statement. (Exhs. 
6, 7) There is a conflict in the testimony as to when the 
request was made, but respondent called appellant, Dwane Sykes, 
and advised him of the pending refinancing of the contract and 
that the bank wanted a written authorization from appellant to 
use funds paid by the respondent on contract to pay off 
appellants• trust deed to the bank (Rl73:4-8; R308:21-29; R309: 
21-23). Appellant, Dwane Sykes, agreed to give such 
authorization (although he contended the bank did not need it) 
after respondent signed a contract for the purchase of two other 
lots, designated as Lots 13 and 14 (Rl73:20-26). Appellant 
agreed to send the contract for the two lots to respondent. 
There followed a series of phone calls over a period of weeks 
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from respondent to appellant asking if the contract had been 
sent, to which calls appellant apoligized for the delay and 
promised to send the contract. 
On November 15, 1976, the contract for lots 13 and 14 
at a purchase price of $20,000.00 was received in the mail by 
respondent who was then in California. Respondent signed the 
contract on November 16, 1976, and mailed it back that day with 
his check for $3,000.00 down payment (Rl95:6-30) (Exh. 9). 
Appellant subsequently rejected the offer made by respondent in 
the contract (Rl99: 17-23) (Exh. 10). 
On November 11, 1976, appellan~s caused a Notice of 
Termination of the contract on the Musk Ox property (Exh. 4) to 
be issued and sent to the respondent who received it on November 
17, 1976. Appellants closed the escrow at the bank, withdrew 
the documents and latter recorded the quit claim deed from 
respondent to appellants which had been part of the escrow 
documents. 
On November 17, 1976, respondent called appellant 
concerning the Notice of Termination; appellant professed no 
knowledge of it but later confirmed it had been given because of 
respondent~ delinquency. 
Up until the receipt of the Notice of Termination, 
respondent was telephoning appellant repeatedly attempting to 
get the authorization requested by the bank to complete the 
refinancing and pay off the contract. Appellant never gave the 
requested authorization (Rl75:9-15; 176:6-20). 
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The property at the time of the termination was worth 
as much as it had been sold for to respondent, i.e., $40,000.00 
( Rl 77: 23-25) . 
On February 9, 1977, the bank sent a letter to the 
appellants advising them that their loan was delinquent and 
demanding payment of the delinquent amounts within thirty (30) 
days or the bank would accelerate the obligation and foreclose 
its trust deed (Exh. 30). 
On February 15, 1977, appellants entered into an 
Earnest Money Agreement for the sale of the Musk Ox property to 
Johnny Iverson and by a deed dated February 15, 1977 and 
delivered to Iverson in early April 1977, conveyed the property 
to Iverson. The purchase price was $20,663.38 (approximately 
one-half the value of the property) payable $8,ooo.oo cash and 
assumption of the trust deed obligation at the bank in the 
amount of $12,663.38. Johnny Iverson was the brother-in-law of 
appellants (R302:21-24; R303:17-25). 
During the period between the receipt of the Notice of 
Termination and the agreement to sell the property to Iverson, 
negotiations were taking place between appellant and respondent 
to permit respondent to reinstate the delinquent contract. A 
condition of reinstatement in each instance required respondent 
to purchase the two other lots, 13 and 14, for $25,000.00. 
These are the same lots appellants sent the contract to 
respondent on for $20,000.00. Respondent declined to reinstate 
on those conditions (Exh. 10 and Rl78:10-30; Rl79:1-26). 
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By Notice of Default and Election to Sell dated July 
18, 1977, the trustee in the trust deed given to the bank by 
appellants gave notice that the property would be sold on 
October 19, 1977 (Exh. 31) . 
The Musk Ox property was vacant and in its unimproved 
state would produce no income. According to appellants • 
testimony the use of the property was worth approximately $500 
to $600 a year. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE ALASKSA LAW 
ON FORFEITURE AND DAMAGES 
Respondent believes that Points II and III of 
appellants• brief are included in the subject matter of Point I; 
so, respondent~ brief will treat Points I, II and III together. 
In this matter the trial court indicated that the law 
of Alaska was the applicable law, but indicated that the Court 
did not believe that the Alaska law was significantly different 
from Utah law. 
The trial court was correct in its application of 
Alaska law and was also correct in concluding Alaska law was not 
significantly different from Utah law so far as refusing to 
enforce a forfeiture which would be inequitable. 
Utah Courts have adopted some guidelines regarding 
forfeiture in land purchase contracts which appear to be absent 
from case law in Alaska, but neither Court has allowed a strict 
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forfeiture which violated fundamental principles of equity and 
fair dealing. 
In the case of Land Development, Inc. vs. Padgett, 369 
P.2d 888 (Alaska 1962) the Court refused to enforce literally the 
forfeiture provision of the contract and adopted a rule which 
remains the law in Alaska that where the equities so indicate, 
the Court is justified in refusing to enforce a forfeiture 
provision of a contract. In that case, the buyers had paid 
principal and interest in the amount of $9,500.00, leaving a 
balance due on principal of $2,435.00. 
In Jameson vs. Wurtz, 396 P.2d 68 (Alaska 1964) in 
reversing the lower court which had denied the purchaser specific 
performance of a long term real estate contract the Court stated 
at page 74: 
"Moreover in Land Development, Inc. vs. Padgett, 
this Court has established by case rule in Alaska 
the further principle that where the contract 
involves land the buyer will be relieved from 
strict forfeiture if enforcement of the 
forfeiture would cause a loss to him all out of 
proportion to any injury that might be sustained 
by the seller. 
In the Jameson case, the Court also stated at Page 74: 
"Also to be considered is the principal that equity 
abhors a forfeiture and will seize upon slight 
circumstances to relieve a party therefrom. 
Speaking on this principle the Supreme Court of 
the United States has said: 
'Forfeitures are not favored in the law. 
They are often the means of great 
oppression and injustice. And, where 
adequate compensation can be made, the 
law in many cases, and equity in all 
cases, discharges the forfeiture, upon 
such compensation being made ••• '"· 
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The Court also recognized the legal principle approved 
by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Shull vs. Welch, (387 P.2d 
606) that: 
"In an equitable action, the presumption is in favor 
of the correctness of the finding of the trial court, 
and it will not be set aside unless against the clear 
weight of the evidence". 
In the matter before this Court, the trial court awarded 
to the appellants compensation of $3500.00, and interest on the 
contract balance from the date of the last payment, August 2, 
1976 to August 15, 1977, although the contract was terminated 
November 11, 1976 (Rl09: 6 a, b, c). This in the opinion of the 
trial court constituted adequate compensation to the appellant. 
In Williams vs. DeLay, 395 P.2d 839 (Alaska 1964), the 
Court after dealing with points of law and a line of cases from 
other jurisdictions stated at page 846: 
"The foregoing may be acceptable principles of law 
in their place, but in Alaska we are committed to 
the rule announced in our decision in the case of 
Land Development, Inc. vs. Padgett that the trial 
court may refuse to enforce literally the forfeiture 
provisions of a real estate contract, for this is 
a matter of discretion which is directly related to 
the equities of the situation." 
In Moran vs. Holman, 501 P.2d, 769, although (Alaska 
1972) the buyer had made only six monthly payments in the course 
of 16 months and had defaulted in other provisions of the 
contract, the trial court refused to enforce the forfeiture 
provisions of the contract. At page 771 the Court states: 
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"While the Court has so far refused to enforce the 
forfeiture provisions of an installment land contract 
only in cases involving more sizeable investments by 
the vendee prior to the vendor's invocation of the 
forfeiture, we did not intend in Padgett, DeLay, 
Jameson, or McCormick to promulgate a purely quanti-
tative rule. Rather, we adopted the position espoused 
by the United States Supreme Court in Knickerbocker 
Life Insurance Company vs. Norton, 96 US 234, that 
'where adequate compensation can be 
made - -equity - - discharges the 
forfeiture, upon such compensation 
being made'. 
"The primary consideration for a Court faced with a 
choice between specific performance and 
enforcement of a forfeiture clause was stated 
well in Ward vs. Union Bond and Trust Company~ 243 
Federal· 2d. 476: 
"The ultimate aim in these proceedings 
in equity must be to save the 
respective parties harmless from loss 
or damage and, if just and equitable, 
place them in the status quo of their 
contract so as to permit them as vendor 
and vendee to each have the benefit of 
their respective bargains, voluntarily 
entered into - - - not to be measured in 
the light or economics of subsequent 
events, but as of the day of the 
contract'"· 
The one Alaska case which permits a strict forfeiture is 
Alaska Placer Company vs. Lee, 455 P.2d 218 (Alaska 1969) and is a 
case in which the purchase price was $400,000.00; the buyer had 
paid only $2,500.00 and had defaulted in other provisions of the 
contract. In that case the Court stated at Page 227: 
"Considering the very small percentage of the total 
purchase price paid by Lee, the fact that in prior 
years Lee had failed to put the mining claims in 
production, and the fact that appellant was counting 
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on Lee to produce in 1965, which he did not do, we 
do not consider it inequitable to enforce the fore-
feiture clause of the contract according to its 
terms." 
Appellants cite the case of Lonas vs. Metropolitan 
Mortgage and Securities Company, 432 P.2d 603 (Alaska 1967) as 
authority for the proposition that the Alaska law allows enforce-
ment of a forfeiture if that remedy is provided in the contract. 
The case does not go into the matters of the equities involved or 
the loss sustained by each of the parties in the event of 
forfeiture. This case really stands for the proposition that a 
forfeiture provision in a contract, unless made the exclusive 
remedy by the contract itself, does not exclude the pursuit of 
any other remedy which the law affords. In that case the Court 
states at page 605: 
"The forfeiture provision is not made exclusive. In 
such a case, the seller is entitled to pursue in addi-
tion to the remedy specifically mentioned in the con-
tract, any other remedy which the law affords." 
In the instant case, the trial court found that over a 
period of 22 months respondent made some 14 payments totaling 
$23,216.72, leaving an unpaid contract balance of $20,290.66. The 
Court then applied the Alaska law and in its discretion denied 
the enforcement of forfeiture provision of the contract as being 
inequitable under the circumstances, but in keeping with the 
Moran and Knickerbocker cases (supra) awarded to the appellants 
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which the Court considered to be adequate compensation in the 
matter. 
Appellants in point II of their brief contend that not-
withstanding the plaintiff's repeated defaults and misrepresen-
tations, the trial court erroneously refused to enforce the 
contract terms for termination of contract rights. 
The trial court did not refuse to enforce the contract 
terms for termination of contract rights; the trial court allowed 
the termination to stand but refused to allow appellants to 
retain all the payments made by respondent as liquidated damages 
because the Court found that to do so would be an inequitable 
forfeiture. 
Appellants go to considerable detail to show that 
respondent had not done equity and could not ask the Court to 
grant equity to him, but appellants in their brief fail to state 
that up until the termination of the contract, negotiations were 
taking place between the parties for paying off the contract 
through respondent's making a loan from the bank. 
Respondent notified appellants he had been to the bank 
to get a loan to pay off the contract and asked respondent to 
give the bank written authorization, requested by the bank, to 
use proceeds from the payoff of the contract to pay appellants' 
obligation to the bank. 
The appellants never did furnish the requested authori-
zation. Instead, appellants agreed to send such authorization 
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after respondent had signed a contract to purchase two other 
lots. Before the contract on the two lots was received by 
respondent for signature, the Notice of Termination had already 
been issued. 
One who frustrates the performance of a contract by his 
own conduct - the setting of conditions he has no legal right to 
assert - cannot in equity ask the Court to find he comes into 
Court with clean hands and grant him relief at the expense of the 
other party. 
The trial court had all this before it together with 
evidence of respondent's defaults and so-called misrepresenta-
tions, and based on all the facts concluded that to enforce the 
forfeiture provision and permit the appellants to take back the 
property worth as much as it was worth when it was sold to the 
respondent and to retain the entire $23,216.72 paid by respondent 
would be inequitable. 
It is respondent's position that when appellants 
terminated the contract and took the property back they made an 
election; they knew what they were getting; they knew the trust 
deed they had given on the property to the bank was delinquent. 
They then had the property worth at least as much as it had been 
sold for to respondent; they had some $23,000.00 of respondent's 
money. To allow them to retain both would be inequitable. 
Appellants argue that to require them to return part of 
the money paid be respondent would be to reward the defaulting 
party at the expense of the party not in default. 
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In arriving at this position, appellants further argue 
that they were forced to sell the property at half its value or 
what was was owed by respondent on the contract. 
Respondent at the trial unsuccessfully objected to 
evidence of the so-called distress sale, maintaining that the 
rights and equities of the parties were fixed when the contract 
was terminated. 
But even in the light of such evidence, there are 
defects in appellants' agrument: 
1. Appellants did not have to sell the property, at the 
time they did under the adverse circumstances of wintertime. The 
Notice of Default and Election to Sell given on behalf of the 
bank which held appellants' trust deed was not given until July 
18, 1977 and the sale, as set in the notice, was not to take 
place until October 19, 1977. Appellants would have had the time 
from November 11, 1976, when they terminated the contract, until 
October 19, 1977 in which to sell the property at a fair price. 
2. The purchaser at what the appellants contend to be a 
distress sale by them for one-half the value of the property was 
to appellants' brother-in-law. This cannot, in an equity matter 
be considered as an arms length, fair transaction. 
This entire approach is contrary to the principle set 
forth in the Ward case (supra) that the aim of "proceedings in 
equity must be to save the parties harmless from loss or damage, 
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and if just and equitable, place them in the status quo of their 
contract to permit them to have the benefit of their respective 
bargains, voluntarily entered into --- not to be measured in the 
light or economics of subsequent events, but as of the day of 
contract". (Emphasis added) 
POINT II 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS 
ENTITLED TO NOTICE OF THE INTENDED SALE AND REASONABLE 
OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE DEFENDANT WHOLE BEFORE THE SALE WAS MADE. 
The Court had before it evidence that respondent in 
August 1976 decided to try to refinance the contract and went to 
the escrow bank in early September 1976 and received tentative 
approval for a loan to pay off the contract and on October 5, 
1976, signed a note and trust deed and furnished other requested 
information and documents to the bank. Respondent called 
appellant Dwane Sykes and advised him of the pending loan and the 
payoff of the
0
contract and further advised appellant that the 
bank wanted written authorization from him to use funds paid by 
respondent on the contract to pay off the trust deed loan to the 
bank. Appellant agreed to give such authorization after 
respondent signed a contract for the purchase of two other tracts 
of land, lots 13 and 14, for $20,000.00. Appellant agreed to 
send the contract for the two lots to respondent. There followed 
a series of phone calls from respondent to appellant attempting 
to get appellant to send the contracts to him so he could then 
get the requested authorization and close his loan at the bank. 
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On November 15, 1976, the contract for the two lots 
(Exh. 9) was received in the mail by respondent who was then in 
California and who signed the contract November 16th and mailed it 
back with his check for the $3,000.00 down payment. On November 
17, 1976, respondent received the Notice of Termination (Exhibit 
4) dated November 11, 1976. Later, respondent's offer to purchase 
lots 13 and 14, as evidenced by the contract, was rejected by 
appellants. 
Based on this, it was apparent to the trial court, that 
appellants had in fact frustrated respondent's making a loan to pay 
off the contract and that appellants terminated the contract 
while negotiations were going on between the parties relating to 
the loan and the payment of the contract. 
Appellants further contend that after the termination 
respondent never did tender cash or a cashiers check to anyone to 
pay the delinquincy and reinstate the contract. Respondent 
refused to reinstate because a condition of reinstatement made by 
appellants in each instance required respondent to purchase lots 
13 and 14 for $25,000.00; these are the same lots for which the 
appellant sent the contract to respondent at a purchase price of 
$20,000.00. Respondent declined to be forced to purchase the 
lots at this higher price as a condition of reinstating his 
contract on the Musk Ox property. 
This is but one other facet of the case which the Court 
had before it in making its decision. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court had before it all the facts necessary to 
make its decision. Based on those facts, it found that under 
Alaska Law a forfeiture would be inequitable. In arriving at its 
decision and applying principles of equity it granted to 
appellants what it considered to be reasonable compensation. 
In reviewing the findings and decision of the trial 
court, the presumption is in favor of the correctness of the 
finding of the trial court and it will not be set aside unless 
against the clear weight of the evidence. In this case, there is 
no clear weight of evidence against the findings made by the 
Court. 
It is respectfully requested that this Court affirm the 
trial court. 
~~ Dated this_\_;1_ day of May, 1980. 
A. H. Boyce 
Attorney for Respondents 
500 American Savings Building 
61 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief 
were mailed to M. Dayle Jeffs, JEFFS & JEFFS, 90 North 100 East, 
P.O. BQX 683, Provo, Utah 84601, attorney for appellants, on 
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States mail, postage prepaid. 
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